It is undisputed that Mr. Lemelle was a patron of the Crown at the time of the April 22, accident and that subsequent testing revealed that he was intoxicated when he fell. It is also undisputed that the Crown has been moored dockside in Westlake, Louisiana since Lemelle filed this suit, alleging negligence on the part of St. Charles in its service of alcohol to patrons.
Thereafter, St. Lemelle's claim must be dismissed. Lemelle responded with a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that the Crown was a vessel for his maritime claim. The parties' cross motions on the issue of vessel status focused on the fact that the Crown entered into its service as a riverboat casino carrying passengers on gaming cruises. However, in , well before the accident at issue, the Louisiana legislature amended La.
The parties' evidence indicates that the Crown has been docked since that time, with no further cruises conducted. Instead, the Crown has been moored in Westlake, secured to a concrete wharf by a system of lines and cables.
It is serviced by landside connections for cable, electricity, surveillance, water, and sewage. The Crown is also connected to a shoreside pavilion by way of a guest entrance consisting of a large steel structure controlled by hydraulic ramps, which are attached to the pavilion. Ultimately, the trial court heard arguments on the issue of whether the Crown continued to be a vessel after it ceased excursion operations in Lemelle, finding the Crown to be a vessel and general maritime law applicable.
It denied the motion for summary judgment filed by St. Recognizing the partial nature of the summary judgment entered, the trial court designated the partial final judgment as immediately appealable pursuant to La. Code Civ. In support of its contention that the Crown is not a vessel for maritime purposes, St. Charles points out that the Crown has been indefinitely docked at its Westlake location since the legislative amendment.
It further points to jurisprudence indicating that this same riverboat casino has been found not to be a vessel. Page 3. See Breaux v. Charles Gaming Co. Further, it also asserts that this court should take notice that the Crown's function is casino gaming rather than maritime commerce. As explained in Giorgio v. Alliance Operating Corp. De La Rosa, F. The parties question the Crown's vessel status in this context.
As a starting point, we refer to 1 U. The United States Supreme Court interpreted this definition of " vessel," 3 in its determination of whether a dredge was a vessel for purposes of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act in light of its limited propulsion capabilities.
Stewart v. Dutra Constr. The parties' arguments and evidence in this case center upon whether the Crown was practically incapable of transportation or movement at the time of the accident.
Notably, both a panel of the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit and a panel of this court have concluded that the Crown does not qualify as a vessel as interpreted in Stewart.
In De La Rosa, F. Instead, the Fifth Circuit observed that the Crown was:. It receives water, telephone lines, sewer lines, cable television and data processing lines from land-based sources. It has not been used as a seagoing vessel since March 28, , when it was moored at its present location on Lake Charles, and the Defendants do not intend to use it as such.
Rather, their intent is to use it solely as an indefinitely moored floating casino. Its operations are entirely gaming-related and not maritime in nature. Similarly, in Breaux, 68 So. Page 4. Crown's status as a vessel in a case involving a accident.
It is of no small moment that the Crown, the riverboat casino at issue in this case, was the same riverboat casino involved in De La Rosa and in Breaux. While Mr. Lemelle contends that additional facts were developed in this case that were not available in the previous two cases, we do not find these facts warrant a different outcome.
Chiefly, Mr. Lemelle argues that the evidence demonstrates the Crown's actual capacity to navigate insofar as testimony and log entries reveal that the riverboat's engines were operated periodically around the time period of this accident.
However, reviewing this evidence, we find no evidence warranting a departure from De La Rosa and Breaux. Instead, the evidence leads to the conclusion that the Crown was practically incapable of transportation or movement as described in Stewart, U.
The Crown has been affixed in its dockside location, to some degree, since by lines and cables. It has not sailed since the legislation prohibiting it from conducting cruises or excursions. Crown is connected to an adjacent concrete wharf by nylon mooring lines and steel cables. Crown is also connected to land by utility lines that supply electricity, water, telephone, sewerage, cable television, and computer access.
There is also a guest entrance walkway — a steel structure controlled by hydraulic ramps attached to the land-based pavilion. Despite all of the above-described attachments to land, Crown can be ready to sail on its own in less than one hour.
Crown has a captain and a marine crew who maintain the riverboat in proper operating order. All of the navigational tools and equipment as well as Crown's engines are constantly checked and maintained in proper working order. In short, Crown is a completely functional riverboat. Crown floats on its own in the Calcasieu River. In fact, Crown can and, at times, does operate under its own power free from the shore-side systems for as long as eight hours.
Once or twice a week, the Crown's captain activates and operates both the port and starboard main engines of the vessel. This is done to hold Crown against its dock because when large ocean-going ships dock at or leave from the adjacent shipyard, it creates a significant disturbance of the waters.
Admiralty jurisdiction in tort cases is conferred by 28 U. See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. The party seeking admiralty jurisdiction "must satisfy conditions both of location and of connection with maritime activity. The connection test involves two additional inquiries: a whether the incident had the potential to disrupt maritime commerce; and, b whether the general character of the tortfeasor's activity giving rise to the incident had a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.
Jerome B. The first inquiry is whether Crown is a vessel. Finally, it is necessary to examine whether the test of connection to traditional maritime activity has been satisfied. There are two sources of law in Louisiana: legislation and custom, with legislation superseding custom in every instance. Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp. Code arts. State Law Inst. As Justice Dennis explained, in Louisiana, legislation "is the primary source of law, and precedent serves merely as an example of a prior judge's interpretation and application of legislated law.
Thus, "[i]t should be evident that the common-law or case-law theory of precedent is incompatible in many ways with the legal method of deciding a case Furthermore, the civil law method should be applied to determine "whether the case should be imitated in a subsequent decision. Therefore, "if a judge ignores a clearly applicable Code rule and follows another jurisdiction's case, his example of using the wrong starting point or source of law should not be influential at all.
See also Stewart v. Even though 1 U. A ship does not move in and out of admiralty jurisdiction depending on whether the ship is at an anchor, docked for loading or unloading, or berthed for minor repairs. Similarly, ships that are taken permanently out of the water do not remain vessels because of the remote possibility that they may sail again in the future. The following cases provide some guidance as to whether something is or is not a vessel. A dredge, a massive floating platform that had a captain and a crew, navigational lights, ballast tanks, and a crew dining area, but lacked self-propulsion and was moved by a tugboat, was a vessel for maritime law purposes when it lay idle because one of its scows had suffered an engine malfunction and the other was at sea.
Stewart, U. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that while Crown "was still physically capable of sailing, such a use was merely theoretical" because "Defendants do not intend to use it" as a sailing vessel and, instead, intend "to use it solely as an indefinitely moored floating casino.
A riverboat casino that conducted gaming cruises on Lake Pontchartrain until and conducted all gambling dockside from until Hurricane Katrina in , was held to be a vessel for the purposes of establishing admiralty jurisdiction.
Of Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist. There, the vessel was subject to USCG certification and inspection. The riverboat had a captain and a crew, and they maintained the boat's engines, generators, and equipment in working order at all times prior to Katrina. After , the riverboat was attached by steel cables to the mooring system, and it was also connected to the shore-side source by electrical, computer, and telephone cables. The Eleventh Circuit explained that courts should not consider the owner's intentions regarding the vessel because owner's intentions were analogous to the boat's "purpose.
Because the Supreme Court specifically rejected any definition of "vessel" that relies on such purpose, the owner's intentions were irrelevant. The Eleventh Circuit pointed out that under the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, a boat may enter and leave admiralty jurisdiction on the basis of state law and the individual thoughts of the boat owner. Yet this conclusion is untenable:. I also note the thoughts of David Robertson, the W.
David W. The primary and binding legal authority for this court is 1 U. To be a vessel, the statute requires merely that a watercraft be capable of being used as a means of transportation on water. It is the jurisprudence, a secondary and non-binding authority in this state, which added considerations of practicality to the statutory test.
Among these secondary authorities, the Supreme Court's guidance is certainly more persuasive than that of the Fifth Circuit. As dictated by the Supreme Court in Stewart, our focus should be on whether Crown has been "rendered practically incapable of transportation or movement. While I agree with the Fifth Circuit that Crown's use as a means of transportation over water may be theoretical, I conclude that Crown's capability of use as a means of transportation over water at the time of the accident was a practical one.
As the Eleventh Circuit correctly observed, a boat does not enter and leave admiralty jurisdiction on the basis of state law or the individual thoughts of the boat owner.
This is why that Crown has been attached to the dock since is of limited, if any, consequence. If St. Charles decides to sell Crown and move it somewhere, which it is in the process of doing at this very time, there would be no dispute that Crown would become a vessel immediately. Or, if Crown were to move with its crew to avoid a hurricane, for example, would there be any question regarding its status as a vessel if a member of its crew injured himself?
Certainly, the question of whether something is or is not a vessel cannot depend on the subjective whim of the owner. Moreover, as the Eleventh Circuit also pointed out, a ship does not become a non-vessel if its Coast Guard certification expires. For the same reason, that Crown may only conduct gambling dockside under the Louisiana statute has little bearing, if any, on whether it is a vessel. Finally, I am aware of this court's recent decision in Breaux v. As explained above, the De La Rosa court applied an incorrect test to determine whether a watercraft is a vessel.
Thus, Justice Dennis's sentiments are especially germane: "if a judge ignores a clearly applicable Code rule and follows another jurisdiction's case, his example of using the wrong starting point or source of law should not be influential at all. I also note with approval and adopt Judge Saunders's reasoning he so brilliantly articulated in his dissent in which I joined. Moreover, the record in Breaux regarding the facts indicating that Crown is a vessel was not nearly as developed as it is in this case.
This may have contributed to the conclusion in that case. Finally, as pointed out previously, Louisiana is a state where jurisprudence has no binding authority on the court. Thus, our main inquiry should be whether Crown is "capable of being used Emphasis supplied.
The maintenance of a captain and a crew, the constant maintenance of navigational tools and equipment, the regular operation of the engines, all point to Crown's practical capability of being used as a means of transportation over water. It is true that Crown is attached by various cables to land. Nevertheless, according to Crown's captain, all of these attachments to land can be removed, and Crown can be ready to sail in less than one hour.
Thus, neither Crown's inherent characteristics nor external barriers such as those that would exist if, for example, Crown were placed in dry dock impede Crown's practical capability of being used as a means of transportation over water.
Based on these considerations, I find no error in the trial court's conclusion that Crown is a vessel. The majority errs when it concludes otherwise. There is no dispute that Crown was floating on the Calcasieu River at the time Lemelle was served with allegedly excessive amounts of alcohol, which, allegedly, caused his injuries.
Calcasieu River is a navigable waterway. See W. Cameron Port v. Therefore, the location test is also satisfied in this alternative fashion. The connection to traditional maritime activity test involves a consideration of whether a the incident had the potential to disrupt maritime commerce; and, b the general character of the tortfeasor's activity giving rise to the incident had a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. This inquiry requires the consideration of the incident giving rise to the claim at an intermediate level of generality.
This means that the court does not consider the particular facts of the case but examines the general features of the incident to determine whether this type of incident is likely to disrupt commercial activity.
Sisson v. Ruby, U. The connection test was discussed ably and extensively in Quinn, So. There, the estate of a motorist who was killed in collision with an intoxicated casino patron sued the casino for providing excessive amounts of alcohol to the patron. Quoting Jerome B. Quinn, So. Like the plaintiff in Quinn, Lemelle argues that he sustained injuries as a result of excessive provision of alcohol aboard Crown. Applying the intermediate level of generality, I have no difficulty concluding that there is a potential to disrupt maritime commerce.
Thus, this prong of the connection test has been met. The Quinn court also found the substantial relationship to the maritime activity: "[t]he duties owed by vessel owners to their passengers have long been found a traditional maritime concern. Having previously decided that Crown is a vessel, as in Quinn, So. Therefore, this prong of the connection test has also been met. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
The trial court's summary judgment in favor of Thomas Lemelle should be affirmed. Listed below are the cases that are cited in this Featured Case.
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